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Abstract
There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce
e¢ cient rules, but which of them produces rules e¢ ciently? Is there
an optimal mix of litigation and legislation? The law is inevitably
subject to a certain degree of uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes
the outcomes of trials di¢ cult to predict and, hence, prevents parties
from settling disputes out of court. Conversely, the law is necessarily
certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce
uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the
degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation)
and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such
equilibrium rates of litigation and uncertainty in a formal model, study
how they are a⁄ected by two di⁄erent policies ￿litigation fees/subsidies
and legislation ￿ and compare the costs and bene￿ts of the legislative
and the judicial process of lawmaking. We then extend the analysis to
explore the implications of this approach.
JEL classi￿cation: K10, K40, K41.
Keywords: incompleteness of law, complexity of law, litigation, judge-
made law, legislation.
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2Comme si l￿ on pouvait couper les racines
des doutes d￿ oø naissent les procŁs, et qu￿ il
y eßt des digues qui pussent arrŒter le torrent
de l￿ incertitude et captiver les conjectures!
(Blaise Pascal)
Nemo legem ignorare censetur.
1 Introduction
In The Betrothed, Alessandro Manzoni describes the tragic consequences of
a disagreement about the right of way on the streets of 17th-century Italy.
"They both walked next to the wall, which (be it observed) was
on Ludovico￿ s right hand; and this, according to custom, gave
him the right [...] of not moving from the said wall to give place
to any one, to which custom at that time, great importance
was attached. The Signor, on the contrary, in virtue of another
custom, held that this right ought to be conceded to him in
consideration of his rank, and that it was Ludovico￿ s part to
give way. So that in this, as it happens in many other cases, two
opposing customs clashed, the question of which was to have the
preference remaining undecided, thus giving occasions of dispute,
whenever one hard head chanced to come in contact with another
of the same nature."1
The dispute ends in tragedy: "There￿ s one,￿ There are two.￿ They have
pierced his body.￿ Who has been murdered? [...] Escape, poor fellow, es-
cape".2 Although not all con￿ icts are resolved in such bloodthirsty ways,
disagreement about the dictates of the law imposes a heavy toll on society
in terms of uncertainty of legal entitlements3 and judicial costs incurred to
1Manzoni (1840, Ch. 4, Par. 7).
2Ibidem Par. 20.
3Weber (1925) remarks that certainty of law and predictability of adjudication are
necessary conditions for the achievement of economic goals. Posner (1973, p. 451) ob-
serves: "The costs to the legal system imposed by the uncertainty of decision according
3resolve it.4 Somewhat later than the ￿ctional events reported in the novel,
Blackstone￿ s Commentaries of the Laws of England read:
"The uncertainty of legal proceedings is a notion so generally
adopted, and has so long been the standing theme of wit and
good humour, that he who should attempt to refute it would be
looked upon as a man, who was either incapable of discernment
himself, or else meant to impose upon others."
"[This uncertainty] must be imputed to the defects of human
laws in general, and [is] not owing to any particular ill construc-
tion of the [legal] system."5
Aristotle also refers to the impossibility of achieving certainty in the law
as an inherent limitation of lawmaking.6 Turning to modern legal systems,
one could argue that the rules of interpretation that open most civil codes
are a testimony to both the concern with certainty and the full awareness of
its impossibility.7 The same idea is embedded in the very process of "coral-
style creation"8 of the common law by judicial lawmaking and pervades the
spirit in which restatements and statutes are compiled in the United States
and elsewhere.
We employ the notion of uncertainty of law to refer to the fact that it
is di¢ cult to predict perfectly ex ante how the law will be applied ex post
by the courts.9 For instance, the law may be unclear concerning whether a
to a standard may exceed the bene￿ts of a formally more e¢ cient criterion of liability."
From a di⁄erent perspective, see Dixit (2004) discussing how various institutions support
economic activities absent the law.
4Tillinghast ￿ Towers Perrin (2005, p. 5) ￿nds that the overall cost of the US tort
system amounted to $245.7 billion in 2003, half of which is due to the administrative costs
of the system.
5Blackstone (1765-1769, Book III, Ch. 22).
6Aristotle (350 BC, Sec. 1, Part 9)); see further section 2.2. Leoni (1991, Ch. 4)
provides an interesting discussion about certainty of law starting from ancient Greece.
See Hart (1994) and Solum (1999) on the theory of the indeterminacy of law. See Green
(2005), examing legal realism and Hart￿ s (1994) critique to it in relation to indeterminacy
of law and predictability of adjudication.
7Grundfest and Pritchard (2002) contends that ambiguity in the law may be the result
of an e⁄ort by the legislature to compromise between di⁄erent and often contrasting
political views.
8Llewellyn (1960, p. 120), also emphasizing the role of the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the
rate of litigation, discussed below in the text.
9Our notion of uncertainty is close to the notion of uncertainty used in economics as
opposed to risk (Knight, 1921). In sociology, legal certainty as discussed by Weber (1925)
is intended as ￿ gaplessness￿of the legal system, in which all decisions are applications of
4certain sanction follows from any given conduct, whether a tortfeasor is to
pay damages to the victim of a certain accident, or which of two parties is
vested with a property right.10 There are several reasons why the law may
be di¢ cult to predict. Unforeseen contingencies, the inherent ambiguity
of language itself, the use of vague notions (such as bona ￿de, reasonable
man, or bonus pater familias), and a natural process of obsolescence due to
continual changes in society and technology may all contribute to this state
of a⁄airs.11 Previous literature has examined this problem from three main
the law, abstract laws are applied to concrete cases by the use of logic, and every conduct
can be quali￿ed either as compliance with or violation of the law. See also the analysis by
Carbonnier (1988). Perelman (1968) and Bobbio (1993) deny the existence of gaps in the
law on the grounds that any ex ante gap will always be ￿lled ex post by the courts, which
cannot deny justice. See also Kelsen (1960, pp. 245-250). This claim does not a⁄ect our
reasoning, since we focus on the parties￿inability to predict perfectly ex ante what the
courts will decide ex post; moreover, even if the law is clari￿ed by a court with reference
to a speci￿c case and hence is ex post perfectly clear in such a case, some uncertainty
may persist with respect to how other courts will decide analogous cases in the future.
Llewellyn (1951, p. 14) observes: "rules [...] are important so far as they help you see or
predict what judges will do."
10Although criminal law tends to be less vulnerable to incompleteness thanks to princi-
ples of nullum crimen sine lege or nulla poena sine lege, problems may arise nevertheless.
Pistor and Xu (2003, pp. 942-943) reports that theft of electricity created some uncer-
tainty and hence litigation in more than one legal system in the late 19
th century, as it
was not clear whether electricity quali￿ed as an ￿ asset￿as de￿ned by the law of theft.
11This can be simply due to time passing. However the process of obsolescence can be
accelerated by high rates of activities in certain areas of the law over a certain period.
Blackstone (1765-1769, Book III, Ch. 22) observes: "When the people of Rome were little
better than sturdy shepherds or herdsmen, all their laws were contained in ten or twelve
tables: but as luxury, politeness, and dominion increased, the civil law increased in the
same proportion, and swelled to that amazing bulk which it now occupies". See also Kelsen
(1960, pp. 348￿ 356) and Hart (1994, pp. 124-136). Landes and Posner (1976) considers
that the body of precedents can be analogized to a capital stock that depreciates over
time. Calabresi (1982, p. 2) refers to the obsolescence of law, analyzing the role of courts
and legislatures in American law. Posner (2003, p. 503) observes that the common law
that developed in relation to accidents involving carriages and horse-drawn wagons was
not an adequate response to the legal problems arising from the use of modern means of
transportation. Zweigert and K￿tz (1998, pp. 90-91) make a similar point about the rapid
obsolescence of articles 1382-1386 of the French Civil Code after the Industrial Revolution.
One may object to this trend by observing that, although the rule becomes obsolete, the
decision criteria that judges employ are so predictable that no uncertainty arises, as it is
perfectly clear how they will interpret the law in future disputes. This point is well taken,
but simply turns the problem of certainty in the law into one of certainty in the meta-law
(the rule used to interpret and innovate existing laws). This argument may regress ad
in￿nitum, unless we can arrive ￿along Kelsen￿ s (1960) lines ￿at a common (meta)rule, a
Basic Norm, on which everyone agrees and from which all other rules can be unequivocally
derived. The maximization of social welfare has been proposed as such a fundamental rule
5perspectives: rules vs. standards (when should the law be clari￿ed?),12
incomplete law theory (who should clarify the law?)13 and complexity of
law (who bene￿ts from uncertainty?).14 All of these approaches share the
same aim of providing a theory capable of evaluating di⁄erent lawmaking
institutions on the basis of their ability to produce e¢ cient rules. The key
contribution of this paper is instead to ask the question of whether these
institutions produce rules e¢ ciently.
of policymaking by law and economics scholars, but it is fair to say that there is large
disagreement not only on whether but also on how such criterion should be implemented
(see Kaplow and Shavell, 2002, and the literature thereby quoted) As long as this is not
possible, our argument holds for meta-rules as it holds for rules.
12The distinction between rules and standards (Ehrlich and Posner, 1974; Diver, 1983)
depends upon the degree of precision with which the law is stated. Standards such as
the reasonable man or the bonus pater familias are vague ex ante and their content is
determined ex post by a judge on a case-by-case basis. Instead, rules such as a speed limit
are precise ex ante. Kaplow (2000) argues that legal systems need to ￿nd an equilibrium
between over-detailed rules and ambiguous standards, stressing pros and cons of either
approach. This distinction does not directly bear on our framework. The process of legal
clari￿cation that we describe may concern both rules and standards. On the one hand,
rules need adaptation when they become obsolete and lose adherence to reality: an obsolete
rule may generate uncertainty. On the other hand, standards are more vague to begin
with and need a constant work of judicial adaptation. However, standards need not be
more unpredictable than rules, if the way in which courts interpret the standards is stable
and clear. Likewise, the rules vs. standards dichotomy does not perfectly correspond
to the distinction between complete and incomplete law, to which we refer in the next
note and accompaning text. Pistor and Xu (2003, p. 941) distinguishes between type I
and type II uncertainty. The former refers to standards, which are ex ante incomplete
by de￿nition. The latter refers to rules, which are ex post incomplete as it is inherently
impossible to account for all possible contingencies. Also Ehrlich and Posner (1974, pp.
277-278) discusses the latter feature of rules and notices that rules age more quickly than
standards, precisely because of their speci￿city. A related contribution is Parisi, Fon and
Ghei (forthcoming) discussing the timing of legal innovation through legislation. Scott and
Triantis (forthcoming) examines the choice between rules and standards by contractual
parties in anticipation of future litigation.
13Pistor and Xu (2003); Xu and Pistor (2003). The notion of incomplete law is the
conceptual analog of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore, 1999). The incomplete law
theory focuses on the allocation of residual lawmaking and enforcement functions to courts
and regulatory agencies under incomplete law. Tirole (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999)
observe that for a contract to be incomplete parties must be unable to forcast their future
payo⁄s probabilistically; the logic of this point is analogous to our notion of uncertainty
and will be central in the selection of cases for trial presented below in section 2.
14White (1992) studies the problem of legal complexity from a public choice perspective
arguing that lawyers bene￿t from a certain degree of uncertainty. We return to the role of
lawyers in the conclusions. Eggleston, Posner and Zeckhauser (2000) discuss complexity
in contracts.
6Conceptually, we make a distinction between the e¢ ciency of the prod-
ucts of the lawmaking process and the e¢ ciency of the legal process itself in
providing a certain, complete and predictable set of rules at the lowest cost
for society. In principle, certainty in the law may be attained irrespective of
whether the content of legal rules is in accordance with notions of welfare,
fairness or justice.15 We examine two ways in which a legal system may
address problems of uncertainty in the law; the two lawmaking institutions
that we consider are litigation and legislation.16 We suspect that enhanc-
ing the study of the legal process will also advance our understanding of
the rules thereby produced and hence o⁄er a more re￿ned toolbox for the
comparison of judge-made law vs. statutes.17
15We make therefore no claim concerning whether judges or legislators are more ef-
￿cient rule-makers and whether ine¢ cient rules are litigated more often than e¢ cient
ones. Landes and Posner (1976) analyze the production of legal rules but consider only
the judiciary as a source of legal certainty. Our contribution is di⁄erent because we also
consider the legislature. In Landes and Posner￿ s analysis, new legislation is a source of
uncertainty rather than of certainty, we discuss this possibility further in the text. Priest
(1987) considers the e⁄ect of uncertainty on litigation rates; in addition to this aspect, we
also examine the e⁄ect of litigation on uncertainty.
16Unlike previous literature, focusing in private interference with the lawmaking process,
we abstract from private parties￿e⁄orts to change statutory or judge-made rules through
lobbying or strategic litigation, respectively. We will discuss this issue along with other
motives for litigation in section 6.5. See Rubin, Curran and Curran (2001), studying such
a forum choice by rent-seeking parties.
17The academic discussion on the relative merits of judge-made law vs. statutes mainly
originated from the e¢ ciency-of-the-common-law hypothesis, stating that judge-made laws
tend to be more e¢ cient than those enancted by legislatures, because (i) judges seek
e¢ ciency (Posner, 2003, p. 503) or because (ii) ine¢ cient rules are more often (Rubin,
1977; Priest, 1977) or (iii) more intensely (Goodman, 1978) challenged in court than
e¢ cient ones. These studies are based on the demand-side pressure towards e¢ ciency
provided by repeat litigants. Others have objected that ine¢ ciency may result from the
indeterminacy of the evolutionary process (Cooter and Kornhauser, 1980), the pressure
of organized interest groups similar to regulatory capture (Hirshleifer, 1982; Rubin, 1982;
Bailey and Rubin, 1994), the want of relevant information (Aranson, 1992), the fact that
courts only hear a biased sample of cases (Had￿eld, 1992). For recent studies see Rubin
(2005a and 2005b), Gennaioli and Schleifer (2005) and Hylton (2005). Supply-side analysis
are provided by Zywicki (2003), in which is the competition among di⁄erent courts that
drives the e¢ ciency of the common law, and Fon and Parisi (2003), which introduces the
idea that legal evolution may be explained by whether playnti⁄s or defendants exert more
control over the jurisdiction, having the choice of whether (and where) to ￿le a claim.
From a broader perspective, the debate on the e¢ ciency of the common law is related to
the still growing literature on legal evolution, law and ￿nance and legal origins, studying
the di⁄erences between legal systems with respect to their ability rapidly to adapt to
changes in society (Hayek, 1960), provide good institutions (North, 1988; Mahoney, 2001;
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003), or well-functioning markets (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), and trying to explain the origin of
7Deriving our implications from a large and consistent body of previous
literature, we provide a theoretical model of the legal process. We proceed
by ￿rst focusing on the relationship between the degree of uncertainty in a
certain area of the law and the rate of litigation in that area. The interplay
of uncertainty and litigation is bilateral: more uncertainty yields more lit-
igation; on the contrary, more litigation leads to less uncertainty. In fact,
when matters are less clear and more di¢ cult to predict, parties￿expecta-
tions over the outcome of the adjudication are more likely to diverge. As a
result, parties to a dispute will tend to settle less often and the litigation rate
will increase. Conversely, when more cases are adjudicated, courts have an
opportunity to remove some of the ambiguities in the law and thus reduce
the degree of uncertainty.
Society may incur relevant costs due to the uncertainty of legal entitle-
ments and bear direct and indirect expenses associated with the litigation
process. Seeking to reduce these costs, policymakers may alter the rate of
litigation by taxing it, thus increasing the burden on the parties to a dispute
and improving their incentives to settle.18 Alternatively, the legislator may
intervene to remove the doubts in the system by amending the law. In real-
ity, uncertainty in the law may increase as a result of legislation as usually
new statutes are followed by a cloud of contrasting interpretative attempts.
For the purpose of this analysis, however, we can ideally decompose legisla-
tive e⁄ort into two types: gap-￿lling, aimed at enhancing the law￿ s ex ante
certainty, and reforms, aimed at changing the law. Throughout the analysis,
we will refer to gap-￿lling legislation and only consider law reforms along
with other causes of uncertainty.
Given the mutuality between the degree of uncertainty and the rate of
litigation, the e⁄ects of such policies are far from straightforward. Trying
to reduce the litigation rate (by increasing the litigation costs) will also re-
such di⁄erences (Glaeser and Schleifer, 2002). See also the reports of the World Bank￿ s
(2003, 2004 and 2005) Doing Business Project. For a critique of the common law system
of lawmaking see Tullock (1997). Roe (1996) explains legal evolution as a combination of a
weakly-dominant natural selection of su¢ ciently e¢ cient rules, accidental events and path
dependence. From a public choice perspective, the problem has been analyzed by Crew
and Twight (1990). On the point of e¢ ciency of legal rules, see also Stinchcombe (1999) for
a comparison of Weber￿ s (1925) support for a rigid civilian approach to lawmaking and
legal certainty and Llewellyn￿ s (1960) praise of the piecemeal approach of the common
law. Recent literature also compares rules produced by means of legislation with rules
produced through adjudication on the basis of their cognitive characteristics (Schauer,
2005; Rachlinski, 2006).
18Law and economics scholars have observed that the private incentives to resort to
litigation may not be aligned with society￿ s interest. See Priest (1982) and Shavell (1982b
and 1997).
8sult in an increase in uncertainty, due to fewer cases going to trial, which
in turn makes the litigation rate increase, having an o⁄setting e⁄ect on the
direct aim of the policy adopted. Likewise, clearing up legal uncertainty by
amending existing laws will reduce uncertainty and, hence, improve parties￿
propensity to settle; but, when litigation decreases, the degree of uncer-
tainty rises, countervailing the initial reduction.19 Only by considering the
interaction between uncertainty and litigation can we assess the ￿nal e⁄ects
of litigation-costs policies and direct legislation and discuss their impact on
social welfare.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we set the framework
of the analysis; building on a large body of existing literature we illustrate
the microfoundations of our theory. In section 3, we present a model for the
macro-analysis of the legal process. In section 4, we discuss two policy in-
struments, direct legislation and litigation fees/subsidies, and describe their
e⁄ect on the rate of litigation and the degree of uncertainty. In section 5, we
discuss the e⁄ects of litigation and legislation on social welfare. In section
6, we conclude with some comments on additional issues that may bear on
our analysis.
2 Framework
Our analysis focuses on the decision of risk-neutral individuals whether to
settle or go to trial as a function of how clear and predictable the law and its
application by the judiciary are. Four main hypotheses govern this frame-
work:
1. Litigation results in the creation of precedents which help clarify un-
certain laws; settlement does not produce precedents;
2. Uncertainty in the law supports litigation because it makes parties
more likely to have di⁄erent expectations concerning the outcome of
the adjudication and thus less likely to settle out of court;
19Posner (2003, p. 554) explains: "If [legal uncertainty] is great, there will be much
litigation [...]. But since litigation [...] generates precedents, the surge in litigation will
lead to a reduction in legal uncertainty, causing the amount of litigation to fall in the next
period. Eventually, with few new precedents being created, legal uncertainty will rise, as
the old precedents depreciate (because they are less informative in a changed environment),
and this uncertainty will evoke a new burst of litigation and hence an increased output of
precedents."
93. Litigation costs borne by the parties in a controversy a⁄ect their
propensity to go to trial instead of settling out of court: higher costs
reduce the rate of litigation, while lower costs foster litigation;
4. The legislature may vary the amount of resources invested in reducing
the degree of uncertainty while promulgating new laws, amending or
abrogating existing ones.
All of these issues have been individually investigated in both legal and
economic scholarship. In this section, we will better explain their implica-
tions for our model and discuss their support in existing literature. Readers
who are familiar with the literature can skip this section without loss of con-
tinuity. In the next section, we will present a formal model of uncertainty
of law and litigation.
2.1 More litigation, less uncertainty
Like Kuhn￿ s (1962) alternation of scienti￿c theories, the law needs to be
continually adapted to the modern means of production of goods and ideas,
exchange and interaction. Absent a refreshing process of judicial adaptation
(or, as we will examine in the following, legislative amendments), the more
time passes, the more obsolete any rule is inexorably bound to become. By
adjudicating cases and writing opinions, judges help to clarify the ambigu-
ities in the law and ￿ne-tune abstract rules to an ever-changing array of
concrete cases. They do so by creating new common law precedents or by
interpreting statutes.20 Litigation, however, is expensive for society.
The subtle arts of settlement and alternative methods of dispute reso-
lution are often prized for allowing the legal system to save on litigation
costs. Nevertheless, as Posner (1973, p. 442) observes, enhancing the settle-
ment rate "cannot be regarded as unequivocally desirable" since it reduces
the information-production e⁄ect of litigation. Such information is in fact a
positive externality of the litigation system because it also accrues to third
parties not involved in the dispute and only potentially interested in the
same problem in the future.21 Settlement agreements are not generally dis-
20Calabresi (1982) analyzes the role of American courts in the interpretation of statutes.
See also Macey (1986) and Elhauge (1991).
21Posner (2003, p. 531) suggests that such an externality may justify the public funding
of the judiciary. See also Shavell (1997, pp. 595-596). Hylton (2005) observes that infor-
mation may support the evolution towards e¢ ciency of the common law. We emphasise
a di⁄erent issue; we do not focus on the information gathered by the judge (which helps
making decisions that better adhere to reality) but rather on the information produced by
the judicial decision in terms of making the rule clearer.
10closed. Thus, they lack the ability "to explicate and give force to the values
embodied [in the law, interpret them, and] bring reality into accord with
them. [... As a result, settlement may] deprive a court of the occasion, and
perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation."22 On the contrary,
in the course of a trial, judges not only in common but also in civil law
jurisdictions may help lift the veil of uncertainty surrounding unclear legal
issues and contribute to the evolution of precedents or the formation of a
jurisprudence constante.23
2.2 More uncertainty, more litigation
Aristotle (350 BC, Sec. 1, Part 9), discussing Solon￿ s constitution, observes:
"[S]ince the laws were not drawn up in simple and explicit terms
[...], disputes inevitably occurred, and the courts had to decide
in every matter, whether public or private. Some persons in fact
believe that Solon deliberately made the laws inde￿nite, in order
that the ￿nal decision might be in the hands of the people. This,
however, is not probable, and the reason no doubt was that it
is impossible to attain ideal perfection when framing a law in
general terms."
There are two aspects of the e⁄ect of uncertainty of law on the rate of
litigation that need to be considered here. Firstly, uncertainty in the law may
a⁄ect the rate at which a con￿ ict between two parties arises; secondly, once
a con￿ ict has arisen, uncertainty in the law may a⁄ect the litigants￿decision
whether to go to trial or settle the dispute. Concerning the ￿rst aspect,
as noted in the passage cited above, uncertainty in the law may increase
22Fiss (1984, pp. 1085, 1087-1088) also criticizing the modern trend towards the falicita-
tion of settlement on grounds that settlement decisions may be distorted by the wealth of
individuals, the interests of third parties, or the private need to seek appeasement rather
than justice, and that settlement may hinder successive judicial involvement in the case.
23Litigation may enhance certainty of the law irrespective of the preferences of judges.
What is important for our analysis is the emergence of patterns of decisions on a certain
issue and not the intentions of the judges behind them. Also the emergence of con￿ icting
jurisprudence may improve the certainty of the law, because, as we will see in the following,
what matters is that the probability of success be known by both litigants and not that
it be close to either 100% or zero. In this sense, we adopt a weaker notion of information-
production than in Hayek (1973). In most cases, however, some degree of uniformity is
likely to be eventually reached as some cases proceed to appellate courts or possibly the
Supreme Court. The fact that some courts may be biased in favor of either party does
not a⁄ect our framework. Biases in fact may be perfectly predictable and hence play no
role in the problem we are analyzing.
11the amount of compliance and enforcement errors and, more in general,
the number of violations. For example, under very complex taxation rules,
people may incur in some violations although they intended to abide by
the law. More precisely, uncertainty in the law is analogous to assuming
that there are type-I and type-II errors in the enforcement of the law. One
who believes to act in his or her own right could be punished and one
who intentionally violates the law could get away with it. Literature on
the economics of law enforcement has long remarked that both occurrences
induce an increase in the number of violations.24 An enforcement error is not
necessarily an error on the part of the enforcer, but may be also interpreted
as an error in predicting what the enforcer will do. Thus, due to uncertainty,
more con￿ icts are likely to arise, because the cost of violating (what one
thinks is) the law is reduced by one type of error, while the other adds a
potential cost to compliance, unbalancing the choice in favor of violation.
When this occurs, parties may still avoid a trial by settling the case
as mentioned in the preceding second aspect. Trials are expensive and, at
times, painful experiences both for society and for the parties involved. On
this basis, it is easy to explain why the vast majority of cases are settled
without even being ￿led, at some point before the trial25 or, at latest, "on
the courthouse steps".26 Rather puzzling is instead why any case is tried at
all.27 Th economic models addressing this matter may be divided into two
main groups. On the one hand, Landes (1971), Posner (1972, 1973), and
Gould (1973) provide models of litigation in which parties have diverging
expectations over the outcome of the adjudication. Both parties are opti-
mistic about their chances to win and hence may not be inclined to settle
for a lower amount.28 This divergence has been explained in di⁄erent ways.
24See P￿ ng (1986).
25Posner (1973, p. 429, n. 43) attributes the divergence in the litigation rates in accident
suits and in malpractice suits to the larger uncertainty of the latter, more recent area of
the law. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts (2004), Ostrom, Kauder and
LaFountain (2001), Kritzer (1991), Ross (1980), and Danzon and Lillard (1983) for ￿gures
and studies on the US litigation system.
26Spier (1992) explains that delay in settlement may be due to the parties trying to
signal that they are tough in order to extract a better deal.
27For recent surveys on the economics of litigation and settlement see Cooter and Ru-
binfeld (1989), Hay and Spier (1998), Daughety (2000), and Daughety and Reinganum
(2005a).
28Landes (1971) is the now standard model of litigation. See also Shavell (1982a),
Danzon and Lillard (1983) and Priest and Klein (1984). Gould (1973) also shows that if
both parties are inclined to think that they will lose, it is advantageous for them to litigate
and bet against themselves, thus exploiting their private information. Posner (1973, p.
418) regards this case as empirically irrelevant, because the betting contract will not be
12The parties may derive such optimistic beliefs from some private infor-
mation they possess about the likelihood to win in court,29 which they may
not be willing to disclose to their counterparts or they are unable to credibly
do so or they do not do so for fear of losing the advantage of surprise at
trial.30 A di⁄erent reason why parties￿expectations may diverge emerges
from experimental evidence, pointing to the fact that disputants make self-
serving valuations of their probability to win the case. There is a systematic
tendency for one to believe to have better chances than his or her coun-
terpart.31 Uncertainty in the law makes the outcome of the adjudication
more di¢ cult to predict and hence supports the divergence of the parties￿
subjective expectations.32
On the other hand, others explain litigation by considering that parties
have di⁄erent stakes although they face the same probability of victory,33
that parties may sue for merely strategic reasons in order to extract a set-
tlement o⁄er or other bene￿ts34 or for irrational motives,35 that the rate
of litigation may be a⁄ected by the way lawyers are paid,36 or that parties
may settle in order to avoid the bad publicity of a trial or the formation
legally enforceable and because each party will have an incentive to behave during the
trial as to lose the case. See also Drahozal (2004), analyzing ex ante selection of disputes
to defer to arbitrators instead of judges. Lederman (1999) provides an empirical analysis
of predictors of trial.
29Bebchuk (1984). See also Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Kritzer (1991) and Kennan
and Wilson (1993). Spier (1994) shows that a positive fraction of cases will not be settled
even if negotiation consists of a long series of o⁄ers and countero⁄ers.
30Posner (1973, p. 422). If this is not the case, parties will disclose their private
information in the pretrial phase in order to obtain a more generous settlement agreement
(Shavell, 1989). The presence of discovery rules that oblige parties to lay down their
private information before the trial may facilitate settlement (Sobel, 1989) but, even so,
parties may still be uncertain about each other￿ s investments in the trial, which a⁄ect the
probability of winning (Hay, 1995). Pretrial negotiation may also break down because
parties fail to agree on how to split the surplus accruing from settlement (Cooter, Marks
and Mnookin, 1982); such failure can also be derived from asymmetric information on
each other￿ s barganing power (Farmer and Pecorino, 1994).
31Loewenstein, Issacharo⁄, Camerer and Babcock (1993); Mnookin (1993).
32Hanssen (1999) ￿nds that courts with appointed judges exibit higher litigation rates
than courts with elected judges and argues that this di⁄erence may be explained by the
fact that appointed judges are more independent and hence less predictable than their
elected colleagues.
33See Rubin (1977), Priest (1977) and Goodman (1978). See also Posner (1973, p. 419)
with a simple model of litigation due to higher stakes.
34P￿ ng (1983); Rosenberg and Shavell (1985); Bebchuk (1988); Katz (1990).
35Cross (2000).
36See Anderson (1996).
13of precedent.37 We do not deny the importance of such explanations. In
fact, the relative importance of uncertainty vs. other causes of failure to
settle is a determinant of the elasticity of the litigation rate to the degree
of uncertainty, which in turn, as we will discuss in the following, determines
the e⁄ects of di⁄erent policies on litigation and uncertainty of law. We will
also return on this issue in the conclusions.
2.3 More gap-￿lling legislation, less uncertainty
More e⁄ort expended in lawmaking may slow down the natural process of
obsolescence of the law. A caveat is needed here however. As we anticipated
in the introduction, it may not seem obvious that legislation enhances cer-
tainty in the law; as a matter of fact it often does the opposite.38 Pascal
(1658, p. 40) observes: "les obscuritØs se multiplient par les commentaires"
(the more commentaries, the more obscure the law is).
In order to avoid these complications, we restrict our analysis to a speci￿c
type of legislative e⁄ort, that aimed at ￿lling gaps in the law. In other words,
we consider that, given a speci￿c law, the legislator could make it clearer by
investing more resources in more careful drafting and testing.39 This could
also mean abrogating or simply rewriting a statute, without introducing any
new disposition. Legislation that makes the law more unclear does not enter
our analysis, because the lack of clarity is hopefully not the principal aim of
the legislator, but an accident that could have been avoided by more careful
and systematic drafting. The cost, however high, of such improvements is
what we consider in the analysis under the label of legislation costs. This
view is in line with Bentham￿ s (1817) endorsement of codi￿cation as a way
to rationalize the law and reduce the uncertainty of the legal system. From
this perspective, gap-￿lling legislation may be seen as a public, centralized,
and ex ante supply of legal certainty.
37Daughety and Reinganum (1999 and 2005b).
38Landes and Posner (1976) advances this view.
39Blackstone (1765-1769, Book III, Ch. 22) observes: "[...] a multitude of decisions, or
cases adjudged, will arise; for seldom will it happen that any one rule will exactly suit
with many cases. [...] But, wherever this happens to be the case in any material points,
the legislature is ready, and from time to time both may, and frequently does, intervene
to remove the doubt; and [...] determines by a declaratory statute how the law shall be
held for the future."
142.4 More litigation costs, less litigation
We have already remarked that, ceteris paribus, settlement is preferred over
trial because of its lower costs for the parties. There is extensive literature
on the fact that, if the litigation costs increase, the litigation rate drops,
since litigation becomes more expensive relative to settlement. Likewise, if
litigation costs decrease, the rate of litigation is expected to rise.40 Liti-
gation costs include any cost borne by the parties to a dispute, thus also
lawyers￿fees, time, distress, delay in judgment,41 and possibly litigation fees.
The policymaker can a⁄ect these costs by altering the litigation fee or intro-
ducing a litigation subsidy (as for instance through legal aid). Contrary to
legislation, a litigation-cost policy does not directly a⁄ect the degree of un-
certainty of a legal system, but, through the e⁄ect on the rate of litigation,
has an indirect e⁄ect, which will be analyzed in the next section.
It is ￿nally important to remark that the litigation costs that are relevant
at this point of the analysis are those borne by the parties. The portion of
the cost of the judicial system borne by the taxpayers does not play a role
as a determinant of litigation, but will enter our analysis at a later stage
when we discuss social welfare.
3 Model
The reciprocal in￿ uence of uncertainty and litigation on each other can be
illustrated by means of a simple model. Let L 2 [0;1] denote the rate of
litigated cases: L = 0 if all cases are settled, L = 1 if all cases are tried.
In addition, let U 2 [0;1] be some index of the degree of uncertainty of law
over a certain legal issue, which can also be used as an index of how much
the parties￿expectations over the outcome of the adjudication are likely
to diverge: U = 0 if parties￿expectations over the probability of success
converge, U = 1 if parties￿expectations are diametrically divergent.
In our framework, the rate of litigation L depends on the degree of
uncertainty U and on the privately-borne cost of litigation C 2 [0;1);
conversely, the degree of uncertainty U depends on the rate of litigation
L and on the legislature￿ s gap-￿lling e⁄ort S 2 [0;1). According to the
four statements supported in the previous section, these relations can be
expressed as follows:
40Posner (1973, p. 418); Bebchuk (1984); Reinganum and Wilde (1986). Even if the
cost of going to trial is higher than the value of the dispute, a party may be able to extract
a settlement if the litigation costs are su¢ ciently divisible over time (Bebchuk, 1996).






1. uL ￿ 0: More litigation, less uncertainty. Litigation enables the judi-
cial system to intervene in the process of clarifying the law in response
to a changing social and economic environment, countering obsoles-
cence, and it may be seen as a constant process of consolidating the
law by means of reconciling it with constantly emerging new scenarios.
2. lU ￿ 0: More uncertainty, more litigation. Private parties￿decisions
of whether to settle or litigate are contingent on the degree of uncer-
tainty over the legal matter of the claim. More uncertainty makes
parties￿expectations over the judicial adjudication more often diverge
and therefore increases the litigation rate.
3. uS < 0: More gap-￿lling legislation, less uncertainty. Public, direct
supply of certainty through legislation ￿lls gaps in the law and counters
the process of obsolescence leading to a reduction in the degree of
uncertainty.
4. lC < 0: More litigation costs, less litigation. A higher private cost of
lawsuits curbs litigation and enhances settlement.
While L and U are variables, C and S are policy parameters. Given any
pair of C and S, there will be equilibrium rates of litigation and uncertainty
that balance each other out as shown in ￿gure 1 (which, for simplicity,
depicts straight lines).
FIGURE 1
Let upper bars denote the levels of L and U that solve expression (1).
Such equilibrium levels of litigation and uncertainty may also be expressed
as functions of C and S, as to emphasize that the equilibrium rates of
litigation and uncertainty depend upon these two parameters: L = l(C;S)
and U = u(C;S),
164 Comparative statics analysis
The policymaker can control both policy parameters: the investment in gap-
￿lling legislation can be varied, and litigation can be taxed or subsidized as
to a⁄ect the cost privately borne by the parties. In order to appreciate the
e⁄ects of changes in the litigation costs on L and U, let us consider the total











An increase in the litigation costs triggers a decrease in the equilibrium
level of litigation. Since the partial derivatives lU and uL appear in the
denominator, and their product is negative, it is clear that when their ab-
solute values decrease, the e⁄ect of litigation costs on the equilibrium level
of litigation is enhanced. That is to say that the less interdependent litiga-
tion and uncertainty are, the more e⁄ective a policy of controlling the rate
of litigation through litigation costs is. Conversely, the more litigation and
uncertainty mutually in￿ uence each other, the more the attempt to reduce
the rate of litigation by means of an increase in litigation costs will be o⁄set
by the fact that when litigation decreases, uncertainty increases and tends
to produce a counteracting force that induces an increase in litigation. As a
result, litigation will decrease less than it would have in the absence of any
feedback e⁄ect. A litigation-cost policy to control the rate of litigation at-
tains the maximum e⁄ect when either lU or uL is zero (the litigation rate is
independent of uncertainty and / or the degree of uncertainty is independent
of litigation).
It is also easy to show that the ￿nal e⁄ect of an increase in the litigation
cost is an increase in the level of uncertainty; vice versa, the ￿nal e⁄ect of a












If uL = 0, a litigation-cost policy has no e⁄ect on the level of uncertainty.
However, if lU = 0, the e⁄ect is larger than for positive levels of lU. In
general, the e⁄ect of litigation-cost policies on uncertainty is directly related





dL = lUuLdL + lCdC. Rearranging we have the expression in the text. The same applies
to all results presented in this section and will not be repeated.
17to the absolute value of uL but inversely related to lU. The results so far
attained can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. An increase in litigation costs reduces the level of litiga-
tion but increases the level of uncertainty; vice versa, a reduction in litigation
costs increases the level of litigation but reduces the level of uncertainty. The
less litigation a⁄ects uncertainty (i.e. the less juLj), the greater the e⁄ect of
litigation-cost policies on litigation and the less the e⁄ect thereof on uncer-
tainty. On the contrary, the less uncertainty a⁄ects litigation (i.e. the less
jlUj), the greater the e⁄ect of litigation-cost policies on both litigation and
uncertainty.
Likewise, in order to assess the e⁄ect of public supply of certainty let us











An increase in the public supply of certainty causes a reduction in the
level of uncertainty for any given level of litigation. However, since uncer-
tainty has decreased, the equilibrium level of litigation will also decrease,
triggering as a result an increase in uncertainty. The attempt to reduce
uncertainty by publicly supplying certainty may be partially o⁄set by a re-
duction in the private supply of certainty through litigation. As before, the
e⁄ectiveness of supply policies depends negatively upon the degree to which
litigation and uncertainty mutually a⁄ect each other. The maximum e⁄ect
of supply policies may be attained when either uL or lU is zero. Conversely,
a reduction in the public supply of certainty will increase litigation and
therefore the ￿nal e⁄ect on the actual level of uncertainty might be partially
o⁄set.
Finally, it is easy to show that the ￿nal e⁄ect of an increase in the public
supply of certainty is a reduction in the level of litigation and, vice versa, a











If lU = 0, a supply policy has no e⁄ect on the rate of litigation. However,
if uL = 0 the e⁄ect is higher than for negative levels of uL. In general, the
magnitude of the e⁄ect of supply policies on litigation is directly related to
18lU but inversely related to the absolute value of uL. These results can be
synthesized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2. An increase in the public supply of certainty reduces
the rate of litigation while also reducing the level of uncertainty; vice versa,
a reduction in the public supply of certainty increases the rate of litigation
while also increasing the level of uncertainty. The less uncertainty a⁄ects
litigation (i.e. the less jlUj), the greater the e⁄ect of supply policies on
uncertainty and the less the e⁄ect thereof on litigation. On the contrary, the
less litigation a⁄ects uncertainty (i.e. the less juLj), the greater the e⁄ect of
supply policies on both litigation and uncertainty.
5 Legislation vs. litigation-costs policies
The relationship between litigation and uncertainty may be loosely analo-
gized to a demand-supply model for the speci￿c good of our concern: cer-
tainty of law. This analogy is only suggestive and may help us interpret the
results in a graphical manner, but it should not be understood as carrying
the usual meaning in terms of prices and quantities exchanged in a market.
The litigation function L = l(U;C) can be interpreted as the demand for
certainty. In fact private parties are willing to litigate and bear the related
costs in order to reduce the cloud of uncertainty that surrounds the legiti-
macy of their claims rather than settle in the shadow of such uncertainty.
The curve L = l(U;C) provides a measure of how much parties are willing
to pay in terms of litigation to enhance certainty (i.e. reducing uncertainty),
for any given level of litigation costs C. Litigation is the ￿ price￿that parties
are willing to pay for certainty of law. Conversely, the uncertainty function
U = u(L;S) may be seen as a private supply function of certainty. Through
litigation parties reduce the degree of uncertainty. The curve provides a
measure of how much litigation is needed in order to reduce uncertainty, for
any given level of the public supply of certainty S. Litigation is the ￿ cost￿of
producing certainty through adjudication. An equilibrium is attained when
our ￿ demand￿and ￿ supply￿cross each other, as depicted in ￿gure 1. Note
that the ￿gure depicts uncertainty on the horizontal axis, while demand and
supply refer to certainty. This is why the slopes are inverted if compared
to traditional models, and why we observe a decreasing supply function and
an increasing demand function.
The above discussion on the e⁄ects of di⁄erent policies on the levels of
litigation and uncertainty may thus be reframed into a traditional framework
19in which the demand and supply curves are shifted up- or downwards by
exogenous shocks either on the demand side (a variation in the litigation
costs C) or on the supply side (a variation in legislation S). The results of
propositions 1 and 2 will be hereafter reinterpreted with the help of simple
graphical analysis.
5.1 The e⁄ect of litigation costs on litigation and uncertainty
A variation in litigation costs C has the e⁄ect of shifting the demand func-
tion L = l(U;C). If litigation costs increase, the demand function moves
downwards as in ￿gure 2 (a). The ￿nal result of an increase in litigation
costs is an increase in uncertainty and a partially o⁄set decrease in litiga-
tion. This result quantitatively depends on the elasticity of the litigation
and uncertainty functions.
FIGURE 2
If uncertainty U = u(L;S) is perfectly inelastic with respect to changes
in litigation, an increase in litigation costs corresponds to a ￿nal decrease
in litigation without increasing uncertainty, as depicted in ￿gure 2 (b). On
the contrary, if uncertainty is perfectly elastic as in ￿gure 2 (c), an increase
in litigation costs only corresponds to an increase in uncertainty, as the
e⁄ect on the rate of litigation is completely o⁄set by the feedback e⁄ect of
uncertainty on litigation.
It may be further remarked that the elasticity of the litigation function
L = l(U;C) with respect to changes in uncertainty of law a⁄ects the e⁄ec-
tiveness of litigation cost policies, the e⁄ect being maximal when litigation
is inelastic.
5.2 The e⁄ect of legislation on litigation and uncertainty
Public intervention in the legal system as a way to provide better and clearer
rules has an obvious direct and negative e⁄ect on the degree of uncertainty.
However, since a reduction in uncertainty also reduces litigation, increasing
public e⁄ort in clarifying the law may be partially o⁄set by a reduction in
the private supply of certainty through litigation, as shown by ￿gure 3 (a).
FIGURE 3
20An increase in the public supply of certainty S as a direct e⁄ect reduces
uncertainty. As an indirect e⁄ect, a reduction in uncertainty also reduces
litigation. The outcome of certainty-supply policies is a reduction in both
litigation and uncertainty. As before, the outcome quantitatively depends
on the elasticity of the curves. If litigation is perfectly inelastic, an increase
in the supply of certainty reduces uncertainty without reducing litigation, as
in ￿gure 3 (b). On the contrary, if litigation is perfectly elastic, public supply
of certainty only reduces litigation, while the degree of uncertainty remains
unchanged, as in ￿gure 3 (c). In the latter case, public supply of certainty
simply substitutes the private one, without any resulting e⁄ect on legal
certainty. Also the elasticity of the uncertainty curve a⁄ects the outcome.
The e⁄ect of supply policies is maximal when uncertainty is inelastic.
5.3 The socially optimal levels of litigation and uncertainty
In the previous sections, we remarked that equilibrium levels of litigation
and uncertainty exist that mutually determine each other. The e⁄ect of
public policies aimed at controlling either or both depends on their recip-
rocal interaction and on the o⁄setting e⁄ects that we have emphasized. In
this section, we address the question of what the optimal levels of litigation
and uncertainty are, among all the equilibrium levels of litigation and un-
certainty that may be attained by some combination of litigation-costs and
legislation policies. In our simple framework, litigation does not directly
a⁄ect deterrence.43 Rather, deterrence is a⁄ected, as we have explained, by
the level of uncertainty in the law, through the e⁄ect that uncertainty has
on the probability of type I and II errors in the legal system.
Let us consider as a benchmark case a world without uncertainty, in
which the litigation rate is zero and the allocation of resources is optimal.
We can then compare the real world to such an ideal one. Finding the
socially optimal levels of uncertainty and litigation and, consequently, de-
signing optimal policies to achieve them in a world with a positive degree
of uncertainty in the law may be regarded as a cost minimization problem.
In this scenario, litigation triggers some direct costs in terms of court ad-
ministration, lawyers￿fees and emotional distress, a portion of which, C, is
directly borne by the parties, while the rest is borne by taxpayers. Uncer-
tainty triggers instead allocative costs, as the lack of certainty concerning
legal entitlements distorts the process of resource allocation. Moreover, the
public supply of legal certainty has a cost that, without loss of generality, we
43See Hay (1994) and Spier (1997) on litigation and deterrence.
21will be represented by the level of public supply itself, S. Let G represent
the overall cost of the judicial system due to litigation and D represent the









with g￿ L > 0 and dU > 0. The litigation costs C borne by the parties
to a dispute may represent a fraction of the overall costs, C ￿ G, or they
may exceed the cost G.45 In the latter case, a tax is levied on litigation. In
either case, C represents a transfer between the litigants and the taxpayers
and is therefore not included in the determination of the total social cost.
On the contrary, the magnitude of the overall cost, G, matters. The social
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(2)
For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that the problem in expression
(2) is strictly convex and has positive and unique solutions. Let C￿ and S￿
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44Posner (1973, p. 400) describes the e¢ ciency of the legal system in terms of ￿ error
costs￿and ￿ direct costs￿ . Error costs are analogous to D, the allocative costs in the text,
while direct costs are the costs G. A fundamental di⁄erence between Posner￿ s analysis
and ours is that we evaluate the cost D exclusively in relation to whether the law is clear
or not, and do not consider, as Posner does, whether the existing rules are the best rules
we could possibly have.
45Posner (1973, p. 418) argues that policies aimed at reducing litigation costs may in
fact increase the cost for society as the number of trials may surge. In the present analysis
we make a distinction between the litigation cost borne by society as a whole, G, and
the cost privately borne by the litigants, C. We notice that G may be reduced, as for
instance by improving the e¢ cient use of resources by the courts, without reducing C, or
even while C increases, as for instance if a litigation fee is levied. Thus the two e⁄ects
described by Posner may be separated. See also Kaplow (1994); Shavell (1997) discusses
an average compensation rule to reduce litigation costs.
22From the assumptions made, it is easy to show that the signs of the













These results show the trade-o⁄at work in the balancing of the di⁄erent
costs derived, on the one hand, from the functioning of the legal system and,
on the other hand, from uncertainty in legal rules. The optimal settings of
the two policy parameters than we consider ought to take such trade-o⁄s into
account. From expression (3) it follows that the private costs, C, a⁄ects the
cost of litigation and the costs of uncertainty in opposite ways; hence, the
problem is to ￿nd a balance in the trade-o⁄ between decreasing the overall
litigation costs and increasing the misallocation costs for a given level of
public supply of certainty. From expression (4) it follows that since S a⁄ects
G and D in the same direction, an increase in the public supply of certainty
of law reduces both the overall cost of litigation and the misallocation costs.
The optimal level of S balances a decrease in their sum with an increase in
the direct cost of public supply of certainty of law.
6 Concluding remarks
While modern economic analyses focus primarily on the e¢ ciency of legal
rules, the legal process itself was the target of scorn by some of the most
pointed writers, from Aristophanes (The Wasps, 422 BC) to Kafka (The
Trial, 1925). On the relationship between legal rules and the legal process,
Holmes (1881, p.1) observed that "In order to know what [the law] is, we
must know what is has been, and what it tends to become. We must alter-
natively consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most
di¢ cult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new
products at every stage". We have attempted to describe the mutual inter-
action between the diachronic development of the law through the judicial
process and the e⁄ects of legislative intervention through the lens of an





































23Although the law necessarily su⁄ers from some degree of ex ante uncer-
tainty, gaps may be ￿lled ex post by the courts. This analysis has considered
ex ante legislation and ex post adjudication as alternative ways to reduce
the uncertainty of the law; we have argued that the rate of litigation in a
legal system and its degree of uncertainty are connected with each other.
By using a simple model we have regarded certainty of law as a good that
can be supplied by the state or privately sought by the citizens through the
judicial process of dispute resolution.
When detailed laws are directly supplied by the legislature, the degree
of uncertainty falls; however, a fall in uncertainty causes a similar reduction
in the level of litigation, which in turn increases uncertainty. Therefore,
the net e⁄ect of legislation on uncertainty is less than its direct e⁄ect. Our
analysis provides the insight that attempts to foster the certainty of the law
may ￿nd a natural obstacle in the o⁄setting e⁄ect they have on the courts￿
lawmaking activity. The likely response to direct legal amendments by the
legislature is a drop in both the degree of uncertainty and the litigation rate.
When the policymaker targets the litigation rate by a⁄ecting the costs
of bringing a lawsuit through taxes or subsidies, the litigation rate and the
degree of uncertainty change in opposite directions. If the cost of litigation
is lowered, the litigation rate will rise, causing the degree of uncertainty to
fall, while the reduction in uncertainty partially o⁄sets the rise in litigation.
Instead, if the policymaker aims at reducing the litigation rate, uncertainty
will rise and thus spur more litigation, partially o⁄setting the intended di-
rect e⁄ects of the policy. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the rate
of litigation and the degree of uncertainty of a legal system are inherently
related and that one cannot control the former without a⁄ecting the latter
and vice versa. In carrying out our study of the legal process, we have ab-
stracted from several aspects that may bear on legislation and adjudication.
In the following, we will o⁄er some comments on some additional factors.
6.1 Common vs. civil law
In the face of the divide between civil law and common law jurisdictions,
our theory posits that broader reliance on judge-made law may yield sys-
tematically higher litigation rates, due to the fact that less certainty of law
is provided by the legislatures. However, the legal process, both in courts
and at the legislative level, is not only concerned with gap-￿lling. Many if
not most laws innovate on old ones, rather than clarifying their dictates.
Law reforms may result in more rather than less uncertainty irrespective of
whether they are carried on by legislatures or by courts, making it necessary
24to distinguish between gap-￿lling and reforms.
Our approach emphasizes that neither the common nor the civil law sys-
tem is in principle superior, the di⁄erence between the two being a di⁄erent
balance in the allocation of costs triggered by the production of law. Legis-
lation comes at a cost that is entirely paid by taxpayers, while the litigation
costs are at least partially borne by the disputing parties. We have provided
some indications of how the optimal mix of litigation and legislation could
balance these costs.
Our theory raises another point that concerns the modern waves of lit-
igation in certain areas of the law, such as medical malpractice or product
liability. We have stressed that policies aimed at reducing the litigation
rate also a⁄ect the degree of the law￿ s uncertainty and will, under certain
conditions, su⁄er from a serious feedback e⁄ect due to the fact that reduced
litigation triggers uncertainty, which in turn tends to raise the litigation rate.
Understanding the way in which litigation and uncertainty in the law inter-
act will help policymakers and scholars comprehend the e⁄ects of policies
targeting either problem.
An interpretation of our results ￿ the one that more directly follows
from our model ￿is that governments may curb the degree of uncertainty
of the legal system by supplying certainty directly through legislation or
indirectly through the judicial system, at the price of higher litigation rates.
A second interpretation, which mirrors the ￿rst, is that governments may
want to reduce the litigation rate and may do so directly, by burdening
litigants with additional costs, thus increasing uncertainty, or indirectly, by
providing certainty and hence removing the motives for litigation.
We have tried to assess the costs and bene￿ts of the di⁄erent ways in
which such policies may be carried out. While the cost of centralized, direct
lawmaking is borne by taxpayers, the cost of indirect lawmaking through the
courts is partially borne by taxpayers and partially spread among litigants
in the form of lawyers￿fees and time spent dealing with the judicial system.
Legislation thus has a direct and publicly borne cost, while private parties at
least partially carry the costs of litigation, both in terms of time and money
devoted to the case and in terms of the distortions that the uncertainty over
their rights imposes upon their activities. Whether the ultimate aim is to
reduce uncertainty or to keep litigation under control, the optimal mix of
the two policies described above ￿legislation vs. litigation taxes or subsidies
￿has been shown to balance their public and private costs.
Our analysis of the legal process is static. Nevertheless, there are some
dynamic aspects of the interaction between litigation and legislation that
bear on the comparison between civil and common law. Leoni (1991) and
25Zywicki (1996, pp. 996-1004) observe that there is a relationship between
the source of law (judicial precedent vs. legislation) and the nature of the
uncertainty surrounding the dictates of the law. According to this view, the
common law is more likely to exhibit short-term uncertainty. Given a process
of regular judicial revision, the common law continually and incrementally
changes but it does so within clear and stable principles that make it pre-
dictable in the long run. On the contrary, legislation is more precise and
hence more predictable in the short run, but law reforms through legislation
are di¢ cult to predict and are luckily to have an e⁄ect on the long-term cer-
tainty of the system. Moreover, legislation tends to evolve with big, sudden
changes rather than with incremental ones. This may bring a whole new set
of problems to the courts, which cannot ground their decisions in preexisting
judicial practices. Although there are relevant exceptions, this trend may
make statutory innovations more uncertain in the long run than incremen-
tal common law evolution. Another aspect that may play an important role
from a dynamic perspective is the issue of retroactivity. While judge-made
law is not retroactive, legislation can in principle have retroactive e⁄ect,
even though not in all areas of the law. The possibility to reverse the law
retroactively may also add to the long-term uncertainty of the system.
6.2 Substantive vs. procedural law
In the analysis, we have focused on substantive law. However, uncertainty
in the law may derive from rules, institutions and practices governing the
enforcement of the law rather than from the law itself. When this is the case,
the process of legal clari￿cation and the striving for certainty is more likely
to concern procedural and public law than substantive law. In this scenario,
improving accountability of local institutions, countering corruption and
limiting discretion of public o¢ cials will be more e⁄ective than amending
the law.47
6.3 Law and customs
Besides the law, customs have an important role in shaping behavior. Like-
wise, they also a⁄ect the way in which people perceive the law and, conse-
quently, they have an impact on the uncertainty of law. As the quote that
opens this article suggests, con￿ icting customs may result in disagreement
and con￿ ict in a similar way as con￿ icting interpretations of the law result
47Recent literature on law and ￿nance is investigating the way in which law enforcement
a⁄ects economic performance; see note 16 above.
26in litigation. Custom con￿ icting with written law may also increase uncer-
tainty when it is not perfectly clear which one prevails. However, under
some circumstances, contra legem customary rules may reduce uncertainty.
As Ellickson (1991) observes, informal customary rules may be so rooted
in a certain social environment that they prevail on the law. When this is
the case, uncertainty of law may be an irrelevant problem, as people will
not resort to judicial enforcement of their perceived rights. From a di⁄erent
perspectives, certain groups or individuals could rely on customs precisely
because they consider them as more certain than the law. Although it is
di¢ cult to say whether in principle customs should be regarded as more or
less uncertain than the law, there may be a selection biases in favor of cer-
tainty. If certainty is taken into account as part of the value of a legal rule,
certain customs are likely to survive, while uncertain customs are likely to
disappear and be replaced by law.48
6.4 Advertising the law
Posner (1973, p. 430) observes that ￿ litigation is a more costly method of
producing information than advertising,￿leading to the point that the un-
certainty in the law could be curbed by investing in di⁄usion of existing
information rather than producing the same information ex novo. Restate-
ments may be seen as a form of advertising the law. In itself, a restatement
is not a source of law but its role as guidance for future judgments is di¢ cult
to deny. In addition, the legal system could rely on information produced
during alternative methods of dispute resolution. Arbitrators in general do
not write opinions and settlement terms are often kept private. Although
other considerations may bear on the argument, lifting the veil of con￿-
dentiality that surrounds alternative dispute resolution may be bene￿cial,
thereby enhancing the production of information. Nevertheless, such infor-
mation would have a real value only if arbitration or settlement outcomes
in￿ uenced following decisions by courts or else provided valid elements for
predicting them. It is not clear however that any of the latter could be the
case.
6.5 Lawyers and law professors
Lawyers and academics are also an integral part of the legal process. De-
watripont and Tirole (1999) has emphasized the virtues of advocacy in pro-
ducing valuable information on the pros and cons of certain judicial or leg-
48On customary law see Parisi (1998).
27islative decisions. In this view, advocacy is bene￿cial for the legal system as
a whole. From a di⁄erent perspective, not only do lawyers assist parties in a
trial but they also provide them with legal advice. Parties may bene￿t from
legal advice ex ante about contemplated acts (Shavell, 1988, and Kaplow
and Shavell, 1992) or ex post about acts already committed (Kaplow and
Shavell, 1989 and 1990). This literature concludes that legal advice may or
may not be desirable for society depending on the context.
The recourse to lawyers is likely to quantitatively alter the propensity of
parties to settle. White (1992) shows that lawyers may have a direct interest
in a certain level of complexity and uncertainty in the law, (because more
uncertainty results in more litigation and hence larger pro￿ts for lawyers)
but not an excessive level, because complexity increases lawyers￿fees and
hence reduces the amount of litigation.49 In our analysis, litigation costs are
exogenously determined by the policymaker. However, it could be objected
that, as the law becomes more uncertain, litigation costs may rise due to
more time being devoted to each case by lawyers and judges. Endogenizing
litigation costs would be an interesting extension of our analysis.
Unlike lawyers, academics produce commentaries and information about
the law which, even if aimed at a speci￿c case (ex ante through an amicus
brief or ex post through a comment on a speci￿c judicial decision), are
written with the purpose of a⁄ecting future scholarship, legal doctrines and
possibly judicial lawmaking. Scholarly attention is more likely to be directed
towards unsettled judicial practices and may hence a⁄ect the process of legal
clari￿cation. The direction of this e⁄ect, however, is not a priory obvious, as
academics often disagree with each other on what the solution to a problem
should be. Certainty in the law may also derive from the involvement of
other institutions, such as enforcement agencies or private associations. The
analysis could be extended to take such institutions into account explicitly.
6.6 Other motives for litigation
In some areas of the law a substantial amount of litigation may be due to
factors other than uncertainty. We have already mentioned some of these
factors in section 2.2, concluding that they do not a⁄ect our model be-
cause they do not respond to changes in the uncertainty in the law and
hence can be treated as constant. Nevertheless, in a comparative perspec-
49Rubin and Bailey (1994) suggests that rent-seeking by lawyers may increase complex-
ity and uncertainty in the law and in general a⁄ect legal evolution in the direction of
producing ine¢ cient rules. On lawyer￿ s fees also the recent study by Baye, Kovenock and
Vries (2005).
28tive, accounting for them may be important. Di⁄erent areas of the law may
display di⁄erent degrees of uncertainty which cannot be fully explained by
di⁄erences in the rate of litigation or legislation. Litigation driven by other
factors than uncertainty may nevertheless result in the production of prece-
dents and statutory interpretation that help resolve the uncertainty in the
law and hence may be a substitute for uncertainty-driven litigation. Areas in
which such factors are important may be peculiar because they may exhibit
low levels of uncertainty even with litigation being inelastic.
6.7 Other e⁄ects of uncertainty
We have postulated that more uncertainty results in more litigation. How-
ever, there are other issues that may play an important role and a⁄ect our
results, namely with respect to law enforcement, risk-aversion and propen-
sity to resort to private arbitrators. Some studies have emphasized that
uncertainty may improve compliance with the law to the point of over-
compliance.50 If uncertainty generates more compliance with the law, it
may in turn result in less litigation rather than more as we have postulated.
More uncertainty may also result in more frequent arbitration and hence less
litigation, as parties meed to ￿nd alternative solutions to unreliable judicial
patterns. More uncertainty could even result in a greater amount of settled
cases if parties￿risk aversion overcomes the divergence of their opinions over
the outcome of the trial. All of these aspects need to be further investi-
gated in order to be able to assess their e⁄ect on the relationship between
uncertainty in the law and litigation rate and would constitute interesting
extensions of our analysis.
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Figure 1 – The natural rates of litigation and incompleteness 
 
 









Figure 2 – Effect of an increase in the cost of litigation 
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Figure 3 – Effect of an increase in the supply of completeness 1 
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